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Although teachers in Cote d'Ivoire receive a rent component in
their base salaries, it does not put them ahead of nonteachers,
wba are likely to receive better in-kind benefits, bonuses, and
commissions in addition to their salaries.
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I.  INTRODUCTION.
The  education  sector  in  Cote  d'Ivoire  accounts  for  over  40%  of
the  government's  recurrent  budget. This  is the  highest  share  of any
country  in  the  world. Within  the  education  budget,  teacher  salaries  are
the  single  most important  component,  represenAlng  almost  60%  of outlays.
In 1977,  teachers  in  Cote  d'$voire  were  the first  group  within  the  civil
service  to obtain  the  uncoupling  of their  salary  schedule  from  the  general
civil  service  schedules.  Subsequently,  they  received  tremeudous  increases
in ealaries. Although  since  then  other  occupations  were granted  the  same
benefit  (judges,  military  and  police  personnel,  etc.),  teachers  are  still
viewed  as the  symbol  of the  policy  of 'uncoupling".  It is  not  surprising
therefore  that in  the  current  period  of economic  recession  in  Cote  d'Ivoire
and  the  subsequent  far-reaching  measures  of  macroeconomic  stabilization  and
adjustment,  the  share  of salaries  in  the  education  budget,  as  well as the
share  of the latter  in  the  o"3rall  budget,  have  come  under  increasing
scrntiny. The question  has  been  raised  whether  teachers  are 'overpaid'  and
whether  consequently  there  18 scope  to reduce  teacher  salaries  without
endangering  an adequate  supply  of teachers. This  paper  provides  empirical
evidence  towards  answering  this  question  by analyzing  whether  teacher
salaries  contain  an economic  rent  component  and  whether  the returns  to
education  and  experience  are  higher  for  teachers  than  for  other
occupations.
The  general  issue  of compensation  differences  between  members  of
different  professions  has received  extensive  autention  in  the  labor
economics  literature,  usually  in  the  context  of an analysis  of segmentation
or discrimination,  but  little  of it  has focused  on teacher  salaries. A
recent  study  by Psacharopoulos  (1987)  concluded  that  there  is  no evidence-Teacws-Non-teediers  Pay  DIfferences  2-
of teachers  being  overpaid  in  Brazil. For  Cote  d'Ivoir-,  a study  by
Bourguignon  (1986)  using  a  job rationing  approach  concluded  that  reducing
teacher  salaries  would  result  in  a shortage  of teachers.
II.  THE  MODEL.
This  paper  uses  a  monthly  wage rate  function,  which  explicitly
recognizes  that  differences  in  salaries  can  be due  to differences  in  both
human  capital  and  other  personal  characteristics  of  workers.  The  model  is
as follows:
LnY 1 . F(S 1,  El.  E2,  Og;  LnH1;  ZI,  Tj)
Wher  Y-  Is  the  *othly  earnings  of  Individual 1.
The first  group  of explanatory  variables  are  the  stan"-. Auman
capital  variables:
S - ruee of  years  of  shoolIng,
E  *  dmber  of  years  of  current  and  previous  Job  experlence,
v .a dumy  variable equml  to 1 If  a diplom has beon  obtained,  zero othwnise.
In the  model,  expeoience  is often  interpreted  as on-the-jib
training,  as opposed  to formal  training. Its  square  is also  introduced  to
capture  decreasing  marginal  returns  to experience.  The  diploma  variable
will capture  the  possibility  of remuneration  being  based  to a certain
extent  on the  formal  credentials  of the  worker.
The  equation  also  controls  for  the  number  of  hours (H)  actually
worked  during  the  month,  because  there  can  be important  differences  between
occupations,  especially  between  teachers  and  others.(l)
The  last  group  of explanatory  variables  consist  of a set  of
personal  attributes  (Z)  and  a dummy  variable  (T)  to indicate  if  the
individual  is a  teacher. A positive  significant  coefficient  of T  would
indicate  the  presence  of a salary  premium,  going  to  teachers,  relative  to-Tachrs-N-techers  Pay  Dlfforneos  3-
other  professions.  This  salary  premium  is likely  to  constitute  an economic
rent  in  view  of the  restricted  entry  into  the  teaching  profession. No
primary  school  teacher  can  be hired  by the  Government  if he/she  has not
been  trained  in one  of the  teacher  training  centers  (CAFOPs),  and  entry
into  CAFOPs  is controlled  by the  Government.  There  are  also  to some  extent
barriers  to entry  at  the  secondary  level  because  graduates  of the  public
secondary  level  teacher  training  schools  (ENS  and  IPNETP)  are  hired
preferentially  by the  Government.  Moreover,  there  is only  a limited  number
of  private  schools  whore  teachers  can  find  jobs  outside  Government
(Government  licenses  are  required  to operate  these  schools). Lastly,  the
teaching  profession  is certainly  the  most  unionized  profession  in the
country,  which  gives  it an almost  unique  bargaining  power.
An alternative  to the  method  discussed  above  would  be to compare
salaries  of teachers  with those  of selected  comparable  occupatione,  whereby
the  criterion  Eor  selection  would  be a  matching  level  of required
education. Although  this  may result  in  more closely  matched  control
groups,  the  drawback  of this  approach  is  that  the  control  groups  themselves
may be subject  to rent (positive  or negative),  which  would  distort  the
results.
III. THE  DATA.
The  data  for  this study  come  from  the 1985  Cote  d'Ivoire  Living
Standards  Survey,  which  canvassed  a nationally  representative  sample  of
1600  households.  Information  was  collected  on a  wide array  of subjects,
including  income,  expenditures,  assets,  employment,  and  socio-economic
characteristics  of the  household  and  its  members  (for  a further  description
of the  data  content  and  questionnaire  of  the  survey,  see  Grootaert,  1986;
the  survey's  data  collection  procedures  are  discussed  in  Ainsworth  and-Tsacws-Non-terhve  Pay  Dlfferen  4-
Munoz,  1986).  A subsample  of individuals  employed  in  the  private  and  public
sector,  and  having  received  at least  6 years  of  schooling  has  been  drawn
from  this  database. This  subsample  provides  a  meaningful  control  group  to
teachers. The  subsample  was limited  to  wage-earners  for  two  reasons.
First,  earnings  of the  self-employed  reflect  returns  to capital  as  well as
labor  which  makes  them in  principle  uncomparable  to  wage-ettrnings.  Second,
the  inclusion  of self-employed  in the  control  group  would  add  a selectivity
problem.
Table  I  presents  summary  statistics  of selected  variables. It
reveals  that  there  is little  difference  between  the  teacher  and  the
non-teacher  groups  with respect  to sex,  age,  experience,  and  nationality.
Notable  differences  can  be observed,  however,  for  the  location  of
employment;  most  non-teachers  work in  Abidjan  (602)  while  only 302  of the
teachers  are  employed  in  this  city. This reflects  that  schools  in  Cote
d'Ivoire  are  more evenly  distributed  across  regions  than  firms  and
administrations.
The  variables  representing  the  education  level  show,  as one  would
have  expected,  a significant  difference  between  teachers  and  non-teachers:
teachers  are  better  educated  both  in  terms  of number  of years  of schooling
and  diplomas  received. Twice  as  many  teachers  work for  the  Government  than
non-teachers.  Teachers  also receive  about  502  more salary  (before  tax)  than
other  occupations.  At the  same  time,  they  work 60 hours  less  per  month  and
enjoy  3  months  of vacation  per  year,  which  is  two  more  months  thar  their
non-teaching  counterparts.  Non-teachers,  however,  receive  more in-kind
benefits,  such  as transportation  and  housing  allowances,  as  well as  bonuses
and  commissions.  (2)-Ticrs-Nn-teadhwr  Pay  D0Iffsre  a,  5-
Table  I
MHEAS  AND STANDARD  DEVIATIONS  OF SELECTED  VARTABLES
----------.----------------------------------------------- __-----------------__-
VARIABLES  TEACHERS  OTHERS  ALL
------------------------------------------------------------------ __---------__
Monthly  Base  Salaries  194216  130737  141000
(115384)  (125245)  (125735)
Monthly  Benefits  18284  37826  34667
(34080)  (73700)  (69193)
- Transportation  2517  11'68  9853
- Housing  12416  12974  12883
- Co.,ission  3170  12046  10611
- Other  182  1538  1319
Total  Monthly  Salaries  212500  168563  175666
(138441)  (170973)  (166747)
Years  of Schooling  12.80  9.57  10.09
(3.57)  (3.53)  (3.73)
Earned  Diploma?  (yes-i)  1.00  0.93  0.95
(0.0)  (0.25)  (0.23)
Experience  10.04  9.82  9.85
(8.63)  (7.49)  (7.67)
Age  33.37  33.30  33.31
(7.85)  (8.27)  (8.20)
Monthly  Hours  Worked  121.11  184.79  174.49
(53.49)  (55.80)  (60.13)
Sex (Females-i)  0.26  0.20  0.21
(0.44)  (0.40)  (0.41)
Work in  Abidjan?  (yes-i)  0.30  0.61  0.56
(0.46)  (0.49)  (0.50)
Nationality  (Ivorian-1)  0.93  0.95  0.94
(0.26)  (0.23)  (0.23)
Work for  Govt?  (yes-i)  0.81  0.49  0.54
(0.39)  (0.50)  (0.50)
Number  of Observations  54  279  333
Standard-------------de-----iations-----------in----parentheses.-----__------__
Standard  deviations  in  parentheses.-Teadw-ure-tudws  Pay  Dlffa  a  8
IV.  DO TEACHERS  RECEIVF  RENTS?.
Table  2 displays  the  regreesion  results  for  the  *xpanded  earnings
function. Two  types  of dependent  variables  were  used in  the  analysist
earnings  before  tax,  which  best reflects  workers'  base salaries,  end  total
earnings,  which includes  all  benefits,  bonuses,  and  commissions  received  by
workers.  This  distinction  is  iseful  because  increases  in teacher  base
salaries  have  been  made in  Cote  d'Ivoire  independently  from  increases  in
other  benefits. We also  distinguish  between  government  and  non-government
workers,  because  in Cote  d'Ivoire  the  government  plays  a leading  role  in
determining  teachers  salaries.  Therefore,  it is interesting  to compare
teachers9  salaries  with those  of other  employees  in  the government  sector.-Tsadwer-Hn-tesec'rs  Pay  Diffsrm=  7-
Table  II
Regression  Result-
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)
Dependent  Variable  Bass  Base  Total  Total
Salaries  Salaries  Salaries  Salaries
Sample  (All  Wkers)  (Gvt  Wkers)  (All  Wkers)  (Gvt  Wkers)
Years  of Schooling  0.1527*  0.1206*  0.1678*  0.1362*
(14.13)  (10.71)  (14.8)  (11.65)
Diploma  0.1451  0.7455*  0.1228  0.5548*
(0.92)  (2.76)  (0.74)  (1.98)
Experience  0.1058*  0.0578*  0.1151*  0.0552*
(7.71)  (4.06)  (8.0)  (3.73)
Experience 2 -0.0018*  -0.00068  -0.002*  -0.0005
(-3.96)  (-1.52)  (-4.1)  (-1.11)
Log  of Mthly  Hrs  Worked  0.1501*  0.0581  0.1302  0.1235
(1.89)  (0.7)  (1.56)  (1.43)
Work for Government (Yes-i)  0.0064  ---  -0.0224  ---
(0.079)  ---  (-0.26)  ---
Sex (Female-i)  -0.0780  -0.3352*  -0.1782*  -0.4536*
(-0.90)  (-4.15)  (-1.95)  (-5.41)
Nationality (Ivorian-1)  0.1351  ---  0.1545  ---
(0.68)  - - (0.96)  ---
Location  (Abidjan-1)  -0.0126  0.1274  -0.092  0.054
(-0.17)  (1.63)  (-1.18)  (0.66)
Teacher  (yes-i)  0.2048*  0.2699*  0.008  0.1027
(1.85)  (2.79)  (0.07)  (1.02)
Constant  8.157*  8.83*  8.33*  8.78*
(16.9)  (16.5)  (16.4)  (15.8)
R2 0.5421  0.60  0.5468  0.6070
F  40.3  34.48  41.05  35.36
Number  of  Cases  333  179  333  179
--------------------------------------------------------------------- __------__
T-values  between  parentheses.
*  indicates  statistically  significant  coefficient  at 0.10  level.-Teaders-Non-teadwers  Pay  DIfferers  8-
The  results  reveal  an interesting  systematic  pattern  between
government  workers  (Equations  2 and  4)  and  all  workers 'Equations  ' and  3).
The  returns  to schooling  are  lower  in the  government  sector  than  in  the
economy  as  a  whole,  but  a large  premium  is  paid  in the  government  sector
for  having  earned  a degree;  this  suggests  a strong  presence  of
credentialism( 3) in the  government  sector  only.  The  impact  of experience
on earnings,  on the  other  hand,  is  twice  as  high in  the  complete  sample
than in  the  government  subsample.  These  observations  can  be easily
explained  -)y  the  more  compressed  distribution  of earnings  in  the  gover.X
sector  thin  in the  private  sector  and  by the fact  that  productivity  is not
a  major  critarion  of remuneration  (if  one  at  all) in  the  government  sector.
For  example,  the  non-significant  coefficient  of experience-squared  in  the
government  subsample  reflects  the  government's  habit  of granting  workers
fixed  increases  (about  6%)  each  year,  regardless  of amount  of experience.
The  monthly  number  of hours  worked  does  not  appear  to be a strong
determinant  of earnings  neither  in  the  government  nor in  the  total  sample.
The  Z-variables  included  in the  equation  are  generally  not  significant:  no
remuneration  differences  are  apparent  due  to nationality  or place  of  work.
Government  workers  as such  do  not receive  a premium  over  private  sector
workers.  This is  perhaps  surprising  in  view  of the  differences  in the  way
the  two  sectors  reward  human  capital  as  we discussed  above,  but  of course,
it is  not inherently  inconsistent  with this. The results  in  Table  2 do
suggest  remuneration  differences  between  the  sexes,  ranging  from  20 to  57Z
in favor  of  men (4).
However,  as  a  recent  study  by Grootaert  (1987)  also  based  on the
Cote  d'Ivoire  Living  Standards  Survey  data  has  shown,  sex  is an important
determinant  of selection  into  different  types  of employment  in  Cote-Tesdwcrs-teedwers  Pay  Dlffer  oer  9-
d'Ivoire,  and  significant  coefficients  for  sex  in earnings  functions
results  tend  to disappear  once  tte  latter  are  corrected  for  selection  bias.
Studies  by Komenan  (1987  a and  b) using  establishment-based  surveys  (which
are less  heterogenous  and  exclude  the  civil  service)  consistently  found  no
sex  differences.
Wi-h respect  to the  central  question  of this  paper,  the
estimations  reveal  quite  clearly  that  when one  considers  earnings  before
tax (Equations  1  and  2),  teachers  do  enjoy  a substantial  salary  premium  of
23  percent. In  the  government  sector  this  premium  is larger  (31%),  which
suggests  that  the  overall  premium  is largely  due  to the  government  sector.
Had  a  separate  estimation  for  th-  private  sector  been  possible  (it  is  not
possible  because  the  sample  contains  too  few  teachers  in  the  private
sector),  the  estimated  premium  for  teachers  would  have  been  much lower
there. However,  when one  considers  the  base salary  augmented  with the
benefits  received  (Equations  3 and  4),  the  premium  enjoyed  by teachers
vanishes  completely. This  is of course  because  teachers  receive
substantially  less  in-kind  benefits  and  bonuses  and  commissions  than  their
non-teaching  counterparts  (see  table  1). This  also  suggests  that  teacher
salaries  may  have  been designed  to compete  with total  salaries  paid in  the
private  sector,  which  necessitates  a  higher  base  salary  for  teachers. In
conclusion,  our  results,  so far,  do not  support  the  presence  of an economic
rent  component  in the  total  salaries  of teachers  in  Cote  d'Ivoire.
The  use  of an earnings  function  to establish  this  result  implies
two  assumptions.  First,  it  assumes  that  there  are  no differences  in ability
between  teachers  and  non-teachers  other  than  those  captured  by the
variables  in the  equation.  This  follows  from  the  standard  assumption
underlying  all  earnings  function  analysis,  namely  that  there  are  no  major
"unmeasured"  elements  of human  capital.  Second,  it is  assumed  that  there-Twac4rsN-tsdw"he  Pay  Dlffrwirss  10-
are  no  major  differences  In  the  direct  education  costs  between  teachers  and
non-teachers.  If  there  were such  differences,  a  higher  salary  for  the  high
cost  group  could  represent  a compensation  for  this  and  not  necessarily  an
economic  rent.  A study  of  vocational  and  technical  training  in  Cote
d'Ivoire  has  shzbi  that  the  annual  net  out-of-pocket  cost  for  teacher
training  was only  4% higher  than  for  other  technical  training  (Grootaert,
1987). Hence,  the  second  assumption  is  valid.
Refinins  the  Results.
An interesting  question  is  whether  the  base-salary  premium
received  by teachers  in  Cote  d'voire Is the  rams In  different  parts  of the
country,  and  similarly,  whetheL  the  absence  of a  premium  in total  salary  is
also  found  everywhere.  To test for  this,  we replaced  the  teacher  variable
in  the  equation  with interaction  variables  between  teacher  and  location.
The  results  in  Table  3 show  that  the  premium  in  basic  teacher  salary  is
slightly  hipher  (the  difference  is  not  statistically  significant)  in  other
locations  than  in  Abidjan  and  that in  the  private  sector  salaries  of
non-teachers  in  other  locations  tend  to be  higher  than  their  counterparts'
in  Abidjan. This  lends  support  to the interpretation  we offered  earlier
that  the  premium  in  base salary  serves  to  make  total  rsmuneration
competitive  with  other  professions.  Indeed,  given  the  attraction  of  the
Abidjan  metropolis  and  the  high  rates  of  immigration  into  it,  a  higher
premium  to  private  sector  workers  salaries  outside  Abidjan  may  well  be
necessary  to recruit  and  retain  them in  rural  areas  and in  cities  other
than  Abidjan.-Teedwe-Non-tadwrs  Pay  Dlfferncss 11-
Table  III
Rogression  Coefficients  of Teacher-Location
Interaction  Dummy  Varisbles
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)
Dependent  Variable  Base  Base  Total  Total
Salaries  Salaries  Salaries  Salaries
Sample  (All)  (Govt)  (All)  (Govt)
---------------------------------------------------------------- __-----------__
Teachers  in  Abidjan  0.1874  0.2998*  -0.0408  0.1301
(0.97)  (1.73)  (-0.20)  (0.72)
Teachers  in  Other  Locations  0.2071*  0.3148*  -0.0128  0.1149
(1.65)  (2.94)  (-0.10)  (1.03)
Non-Teachers  in  Abidjan  -0.0116  0.1587*  -0.1013  0.0624
(-0.15)  (1.87)  (-1.22)  (0.71)
Non-Teachers  in  Other  Loc.
T-values  between  parentheses.
*  indicates  statistically  significant  coefficients  at 0.10  level.
The  sample  underlying  the  estimation  in  Table  2 contains
employees  with  at  least  six  years  of education.  Currently,  however,  the
minmu  level  of education  required  in  Cote  d'Ivoire  to  be a  school  teacher
is 10  years. The  teachers  in the  sample  with less  education  could  thus  be
seen  as  belonging  to the 'old  generation'  of teachers. In  order  to see
whether  they  represent  'abnormal'  cases,  we reestimated  the earnings
equation  over  the  subsample  of employees  with  at least  10  years  of
education. Table  4 reveals  that  the  differential  between  teachers  and
other  employees  is essentially  the  same  for  that  subsample  as for  the
original  subsample  (the  t-value  for  the  difference  between  the  coefficients
in  the  two  equations  is below  the  critical  value).-Teahrs-No-teasrs  Pay  Dlfforsxe  12-
Tabl-  IV
Regression  Coefficients  of Teacher  Dummy  Variables
According  to  Minimum  Level  of Schooling
---------------------------------------------------------------- __-----------__
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)
Dependent  Variable  Base  Base  Total  Total
Salaries  Salaries  Salaries  Salaries
Sample  (All)  (Govt)  (All)  (Govt)
---------------------------------------------------------------- __-----------__
6  Years  of Educ.  or Higher  0.2048*  0.2699*  0.008  0.1027
(1.85)  (2.79)  (0.01)  (1.02)
10  Years  of Educ.  or Higher  0.1759  0.2980*  -0.004  0.1383
(1.38)  (2.83)  (-0.03)  (1.29)
-------------------------------------------------------------- __-------------__
T-values  between  parentheses.
indicates  statistically  significant  coefficients  at 0.10  level.
The  results  do confirm,  however,  that  any  premium  received  by
teachers  in their  base salary  results  mostly  from  government  wage setting
behavior.  However,  when all  benefits  are  included,  the  differential  again
disappears.  We thus  maintain  the  conclusion  that  teachers  as a group,  when
considering  their  total  earnings,  are  not  better  paid  than  other  employees.
Two  further  aspects  remain  to  be investigated.  The  first  one
concerns  the  total  number  of months  worked  per  year  by each  group. We
mentioned  earlier  that  teachers  enjoy  three  months  of paid  vacations  versus
one  month  for  other  employees. It  may  be argued  this represents  a de facto
reduction  of  hours  worked  by teachers.  Although  the  estimations  have  shown
a  time-worked  elasticity  of total  earnings  insignificantly  different  from
zero,  it is  still  worthwhile  to account  for  the  extra  vacation  by adjusting
the  average  monthly  hours  worked  accordingly.  The results,  however,  were
not  significantly  different  from  those  in  Table  2.  (5)
The second  aspect  that  remains  to be investigated  is  whether  the
preceding  results  hold  as  well for  any  particular  group  of teachers  (i.e.
primary,  secondary  or higher  education  teachers).  To that  effect,  we-Teachers-Non-teachers  Pay  Differences  13-
selected  all  primary  school  teachers  in  the  sample  and  pooled  them  with a
subsample  of non-teacher  employees  with 6 to 15  years  of education  --  the
range  of education  corresponding  to that  of primary  school  teachers  -- who,
hence,  provide  a  meaningful  control  group. The results  in  the first  line
of Table  5 show  that  a salary  premium  for  primary  school  teachers  exists
mainly  in the  public  sector  and  that it  disappears  when total  earnings  are
considered. In line  with our  earlier  argument  about  teachers  with less
than 10  years  of education,  we also  show  the  results  for  primary  school
teachers  with 10 to 15  years  of education.  As in  Table  4, the  results
suggest  that the  base salary  premium  is not  significantly  different  between
the  two  groups  of teachers.  Again,  there  is no  evidence  that  primary  school
teachers  receive  rents  when  total  remuneration  is  considered.  (The  lack  of
sufficient  observations  unfortunately  did  not  allow  to repeat  this  analysis
for  the  other  types  of teachers.)
Table  V
Regression  Coefficients  of Teacher  Dummy  Variables
For  Primary  School  Teachers
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)
Dependent  Variable  Base  Base  Total  Totcl
Salaries  Salaries  Salaries  Salaries
Sample  (All)  (Govt)  (All)  (Govt)
---------------------------------------------------------------- __-----------__
6-15  Years  of Education  0.1037  0.2378*  -0.1358  0.0166
(0.76)  (1.91)  (-0.95)  (0.13)
10-15  Years  of Education  0.0786  0.3032*  -0.1711  0.0753
(0.45)  (2.07)  (-0.94)  (0.52)
T-values  between  parentheses.
*  indicates  a statistically  significant  regression  coefficient.-Tahsr-on-teachsw Pay  Dlffwrnoss  14-
VI.  DO TEACHERS  HAVE  DIFFERENT  EARNINGS  PROFILES?
The  previous  section  established  that  total  salaries  of teachers
do not  contain  a premium  ie.  a  component  that  cannot  be explainod  by
differences  in  endowments  of  human  capital  or  by  other  personal
characteristics.  This  does  not  mean,  however,  that  the  returns  to  human
capital,  to both  formal  education  and  on-the-job  training,  are  the  same
between  teachers  and  non-teachers.  To address  that issue,  we estimated  the
earnings  equation  separately  for  teachers  and  non-teachers  (Table  6).  The
results  show  virtually  identical  returns  to a year  of schooling,  but  a
return  to experience  initially  twice  as large  for  non-teachers  as for
teachers. This  steeper  earnings-experience  profile  for  non-teachers  only





Dependent  Variable  Total  Total
Salaries  Salaries
Non-Teachers  Teachers
Years  of Schooling  0.1664*  0.1728*
(13.17)  (6.82)
Diploma  0.1495  ----  1)
(0.87)  ----
Expirience  0.1234*  0.0664*
(7.73)  (2.20)
Experience 2 -0.002*  -0.0(11
(-3.81)  (-1.19)
Log  of  Mthly  Hrs  Worked  0.2064*  -0.0222
(1.93)  (-0.21)
Work for  Government  (Yes-i)  -0.0683  0.2744
(-0.74)  (1.31)
SeY (Female-1)  -0.217_*  0.0257
(-2.07)  (0.17)
Citizenship  (Ivorian-l)  0.  1664  0.0550
(040o)  (0.18)
Location  (Abidjan-1)  -0.0988  -0.2278
(-1.15)  (-1.22)
Constant  7.8755*  9.2830*
(12.61)  (13.63
R2 0.54  0.54
F  37.66  8.78
Number  of Cases  279  54
------------------------------------------------------
T-values  between  parentheses.
*  Indicates  stati.tically  significant  coefficients  at the  0.10  level.
1)  All  teachers  have diplomas.-Tahers-Non-teachers  Pay  Differenocs  18
The  equations  also  confirm  that  hours  worked  is  not  a significant
determinant  of teacher  salaries. For  other  occupations  the  elasticity  of
earnings  with respect  to  hours  worked  is  positive  but small  (a 10%  increase
of  monthly  hours  is associated  with only  22 salary  increase).  This is  not
surprising  if  one  knows  that  all  of teacher  contracts  and  the  majority  of
private  employment  contracts  in  Cote  d'Ivoire  set  salary  on a  monthly  basis
and  that  hours  worked  is an important  earnings  determinant  only for
low-level  workers.  (5)
The  splitting  of the  sample  to estimate  separate  equations  for
teachers  a  '  non-teachers  assumes  that  there  are  no significant  omitted
variables  which  also  determine  the  selection  into  the  teaching  profession.
To test for  the  presence  of  possible  selection  bias,  we applied  Heckman's
(1979)  two-stage  technique,  whereby  the first  stage  was a  probit  equation
which  explained  occupation  choice  as  a  function  of  personal  characteristics
(human  capital,  sex,  nationality,  place  of origin)  and  parental  background.
No evidence  of selection  bias  was found.
VI. CONCLUSION.
This  paper  used  multivariate  analysis  based  on the  monthly  wage
rate  functions  to investigate  differences  in earnings  between  teachers  and
other  occupations  in Cote  d'Ivoire. The  analysis  controlled  for
differences  in  human  capital  endowments,  hours  worked,  and  various  personal
characteristics.  It  was found  that  the  base  salaries  of teachers  contain
an economic  rent  component,  largely  due  to the  wage setting  behavior  of the
Ivorian  government. This  salary  premium  is  largest  outside  Abidjan. The
premium  disappears,  however,  when the  total  remuneration  package  is
considered,  i.e.  including  in-kind  benefits,  bonuses  and  commissions,  which
are  more  widely  received  by non-teachers.-Teachers-Non-teachers  Pay  OMffermnces 17-
These  findings  are  consistent  with those  of Bourguignon  (1986)
for  Cote  d'Ivoire  and  with those  of Psacharopoulos  (1987)  for  Brazil.  The
conclusion  was  unchanged  when allowance  was  made for  the longer  vacation
time  enjoyed  by teachers,  for  the  higher  minimum  education  requirements
recently  applied  to teachers  in  Cote  d'Ivoire,  and  for  the  existence  of
different  types  of teachers.  We also  obtained  that  earnings-experience
profiles  for  non-teachers  are  steeper  than for  teachers  revealing  that
possibilities  of earnings  growth  are  more  available  to  non-teachers  than  to
teachers.  Therefore,  much caution  should  be observed  when  considering
salary  policy  options  in a context  of budgetary  restri:tions  in  Cote
d'Ivoire.
While  our  findings  could  be  viewed  as  supporting  a  reduction  in
teachers'  base salary  and a  reallocation  within  the total  compensation
package  towards  in-kind  benefits,  they  do indicate  that  a cut in  total
earnings  would  make  the teaching  profession  less  attractive  than  others,
from  a strict  salary  point  of view.  (6)  This  conclusion  is  of course  only
valid  given  the  current  amount  of human  capital  embodied  in the  average
teacher,  which  as  we have  seen  significantly  exceeds  that  of  other
professions. The  question  whether  the  current  entry  requirements  into  the
teaching  profession  in  terms  of years  of education  could  not  be lowered
without  jeopardizing  the  quality  of teaching  is an important  topic  for
further  investigation.  Since  the  Cote  d'Ivoire  Living  Standards  data
collection  is  ongoing  we look  forward  to investigating  this issue  further
on a larger  database. Such  analysis  will allow.to  expand  the  scope  of
the  present  study  and  to draw  specific  policy  conclusions  that  were not
possible  with the  current  sample.-Teachrs-Non-teachrs  Pay  DIfferences  18-
FOOTNOTES
(1)  Hours  worked  can  sometimes  be an endogenous  variable.  However,  in  the  case
of Cote  d'Ivoire,  salaried  workers  rarely  are  able  to determine  autonomously  and
individually  their  hours  of labor  supply. Hours  thus  vary little  within  each
occupation  as well  as among  non-teacher  occupations  and  are  introduced  in  the
equation  mainly  as a characteristic  of occupation.
(2) We recognize  that  the  CILSS  sample  is small. A census  is usually  preferred
to a  household  survey  as data  base  to do an occupation  specific  analysis.
However,  in  Cote  d'Ivoire  available  census  data  are  too  out  of date  to  warrant
current  analysis.
(3) Alternative  explanations  for  the  significance  of a dummy  coefficient  for
diploma  include  the  human  capital  one  that  degree  earners  are  more able  and
therefore  more productive  than  non-degrees  earners. This  is not  likely  to  be
valid  here  since  the  dummy  coefficient  for  diploma  is  significant  only in  the
government  sector,  where  productivity  matters  the least.
(4)  Income  differentials  between  categories  represented  by dummy  variables  are
calculated  by comparing  the  absolute  earnings  predicted  by the  logarithmic
functions. For  example,  the  coefficient  of sex  in  equation  2 above  is -0.3352;
this implies  that  women's  earnings  are  below  men's  by exp(0.3352)-1-0.3982.
(See  Halvorsen  and  Palmquist  (1980)  for  more  on this).
(5) A reviewer  suggested  that  the  survey  may  have  overestimated  the  hours
actually  worked  by teachers. To further  test  the  role  of  hours  worked  we
reestimated  the  equations  with all  teacher  hours  diminished  by 50X . The  hour
variable  continued  to  be insignificant  and  the  coefficient  of teacher  was not
significantly  different  from  the  the  previous  ones  showing  the  robustness  of  the
results.
(6)  This is  supported  by the fact  that  when  the  earnings  equation  No 1  of table
2 is reestimated  over  the  subsample  of employees  with at least  10  years  of
education,  the  coefficient  of the log  of  monthly  hours  worked  is statistically
insignificant.
(7)  It is  clear  that  people  are  attracted  to teaching  jobs  for  non-salary
reasons  also  such  as the  nature  of the  work,  job  security,  prestige,  etc..  By
the  same  token,  policies  that  would involve  cutting  salaries  might  affect  not
only  the  supply  of new  teachers  but  also  the  morale  and  work atmosphere  of
existing  teachers  which  in  turn  could  affect  teaching  quality.-Teachers-Non-teachers  Pay  Dltfermen  19-
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